Abstract We discuss the relationship between ID-based key agreement protocols, certificateless encryption and IDbased key encapsulation mechanisms. In particular we show how in some sense ID-based key agreement is a primitive from which all others can be derived. In doing so we focus on distinctions between what we term pure ID-based schemes and non-pure schemes, in various security models. We present security models for ID-based key agreement which do not "look natural" when considered as analogues of normal key agreement schemes, but which look more natural when considered in terms of the models used in certificateless encryption. We illustrate our models and constructions with two running examples, one pairing based and one nonpairing based. Our work highlights distinctions between the two approaches to certificateless encryption and adds to the debate about what is the "correct" security model for certificateless encryption.
Introduction
The notion of certificateless encryption was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] and considers the following setting, which is similar to that of identity-based encryption. Each user is represented by a string I D (his identity) and has a matching secret key produced by a key generation center (KGC). Furthermore, each user has also a public/secret key pair, as in the traditional public key model. The main advantages of certificateless encryption are that such public keys do not need to be certified, and the KGC cannot decrypt ciphertexts of users. In general, the security of certificateless encryption schemes is formalized by two properties related to semantic security of standard encryption schemes: Type-I and Type-II security. Type-I security considers adversaries that are able to replace the public keys of users while Type-II security is stated with respect to malicious KGCs.
Ever since its introduction in [3] certificateless encryption has been the subject of debate as to what is the "correct" definition. This is not only a question of the definition of the security model, but also the syntax and functionality of the schemes itself. Many papers have presented differing restrictions for the adversaries in both Type-I and Type-II security games, creating a lot of different security definitions, with each paper claiming theirs to be the "correct" one. Also other papers have presented new syntax (with similar claims). Most of the claims are actually related to what can be proved about the schemes the papers present, rather than some deeper philosophical discussion. We refer the reader to [14] for a balanced summary of the existing models and schemes.
Our contribution
This paper takes a different approach to the study of certificateless schemes, by studying their relationship to identity-based encryption. We do so in order to take a step back from scheme construction and instead concentrate on what the correct security and syntactic definitions should be. To simplify the presentation of our results, we will concentrate on the simpler notion of key-encapsulation (KEM) rather than encryption. In fact, Bentahar et al. show in [6] that combining ID-KEMs and CL-KEMs with data encapsulation mechanisms (DEM) results in encryption schemes that are secure in the same sense as the KEMs. Therefore, given this transformation, our results all apply to the encryption scenario as well.
We show two main results: (1) a natural transform of certain CL-KEM schemes into ID-KEM schemes. In addition, there is (2) another natural transform of all identity-based key agreement (ID-KA) protocols into CL-KEM schemes. We note that all our security relationships under our transforms hold in the standard model.
The motivation for this research is twofold: (i) by analyzing these transformations, we are able to get a better understanding of what are the "correct" security notions and syntaxes for CL encryption; (ii) these reductions may give us a generic toolbox to construct new, and potentially improved, CL and ID schemes.
The current paper is an extended version of the conference paper [16] . In this full version, we include full proofs of all the results and a more thorough discussion of the results and their significance to the debate about the correct notion for CL encryption. We also introduce two running examples showing how our theorems apply to two existing ID-KA schemes from the literature namely those from [15] and [11] . The running examples show that our generic toolbox produces some non-trivial example CL-and ID-based encryption schemes.
Natural conversion of key agreement schemes
At many points in this paper we mention the notion of a natural conversion of identity-based key agreement to certificateless encryption. It is perhaps worth pausing at this point to examine such natural conversions more generally. Consider a standard (non-ID based) key agreement protocol role symmetric such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This protocol consists of two parties exchanging ephemeral secret keys. It is natural to consider the version, often called static Diffie-Hellman, where one parties ephemeral key remains fixed. In some sense, this fixed ephemeral acts like the public key of the entity, and the resulting protocol is in essence a (standard) public key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Indeed, it is the underlying KEM of the DH-IES and EC-IES public key encryption schemes.
A central observation of this paper is that if one performs the same natural conversion of an ID-based key agreement protocol, one obtains a certificateless KEM. It is then a natural question as to how the security properties of the two primitives related via this natural conversion. It is this question which this paper aims to investigate in more detail; as a by-product we obtain the most efficient provably secure certificateless encryption scheme (namely the FG-CL scheme) but this is not where our interest lies. Our goal is to shed light on what security notions one should consider for certificateless encryption.
Pure and non-pure schemes
Certificateless schemes in the literature can be syntactically classified into two large classes, which we call pure and nonpure. This distinction between pure and non-pure schemes also applies to existing ID-KA protocols. Informally, a pure ID-based key agreement (resp. certificateless scheme) is one in which the parties compute their messages without using their long-term secret keys (which is used only in the derivation of the shared session key). As we will show, such pure schemes allow various functionalities such as encryption into-the-future. Interestingly there are no-known pure schemes (either ID-KA or CL-KEM) which do not use pairing-based groups.
We show a natural standard model transformation from a pure CL-KEM to a ID-KEM, and we determine the precise security properties of the CL-KEM under which the resulting ID-KEM is secure in the usual sense. The hope is that this generic transformation might in the future yield new constructions for ID-based encryption. It is worthwhile to observe that this transform does not work for non-pure CLKEMs. This is not surprising as non-pure CL-KEMs are the only ones that can be constructed without pairings. So, in some sense this shows that certificateless encryption is a simpler primitive than ID-based encryption, although the reverse is commonly believed (as CL encryption is thought as an extension of ID-based one).
Towards a correct security model for CL-KEMs and ID-KA protocols
Next we show a natural generic transform of ID-KA protocols into CL-KEM schemes. The goal here is to gain some understanding on the correct security models for these notions. In particular, we investigate what security models in the ID-KA setting imply, through our transform, certain specific CL-KEM security models. For lack of space, we do not look at all CL-KEM security models, but we do consider the main ones. Our results, all proven in the standard model, can be summarized in two distinct points. First, if one concentrates on pure schemes [11] , then the associated transforms have a tight security reduction. This supports our previous point that pure schemes have more/better features. Second, the required security models in the ID-KA setting needed to imply strong notions of security in the CL-KEM setting are highly non-standard security notions for key agreement models. This last point can be interpreted in one of the two ways: either the strong security models for CL-KEM schemes are unnatural and that the weaker definitions should suffice or the security notions for ID-KA protocols (and by implication all other forms of key agreement protocol) are too weak. At the end of the paper we try to draw some conclusions as to what the "correct" models for certificateless encryption and ID-based key agreement should be. Our conclusion is that, perhaps, the strong security models for certificateless encryption are probably correct and that it is the security models for ID-KA protocols, and indeed, standard public key or symmetric key-based key agreement protocols, which need to be strengthened.
Our main generic constructions can be summarized by reference to Fig. 1 , the definitions used in the arrows will become clear as we define them in the following pages.
As a final side-result of independent interest, as part of our analysis we consider a weakened notion of Type-I security for certificateless schemes (which we denote by Type-I* etc). This is because we have discovered an overlap in the standard security definitions for Strong Type-I and Strong Type-II security for CL-KEMs. By weakening the definition of Type-I security slightly, we remove this overlap and at the same time simplify a number of our security proofs, whilst not reducing the overall security result for the resulting CLKEMs.
Running examples
So as to fix ideas we discuss two running examples which typify the types of schemes in the literature, both are highly efficient and practical, yet are only secure in the random oracle model. One pure scheme using pairings (the ID-based key agreement scheme SCK-2 [11] ), and one non-pure which does not use pairings (the Fiore and Gennaro [15] ID-based key agreement scheme, referred as the FG protocol in what follows).
By following our generic constructions through we obtain for the SCK-2 key agreement scheme the ID-KEM of Lynn [17] . Indeed, we recover the security result of [6] on the Lynn ID-KEM, namely that it is secure in the Random Oracle Model under the Gap-BDH problem. The Lynn ID-KEM is itself the natural KEM analogue of the Boneh-Franklin scheme [8] .
While our reduction only allows us to discover an alternative security proof of a known scheme, potentially this connection between pure CL-KEMs and ID-KEMs has the potential to lead us to the discovery of new ID-based schemes, hopefully without the use of expensive pairing computations (if we were able to discover a pure CL-KEM which does not use pairings).
In the other direction, we observe that the CL scheme obtained from the FG protocol gives us almost the same scheme of Baek et al. [5] . Here, however, we have two main advantages. First, the proof of security of the Baek et al.'s scheme was found incorrect, while our transformation provides security for free from that of the FG protocol. Second, the resulting CL scheme is extremely efficient.
Other related work
Our results are similar to the work of Paterson and Srinivasan [19] on the link between ID-based non-interactive key distribution (NIKD) and ID-based encryption. In [19] , the authors present a security model for ID-based NIKD and provide a transform from an ID-based NIKD to an ID-based encryption scheme. We note that the extension of this result to constructing ID-KEMs is immediate. However, this transform is not generic in that it requires special syntactic properties of the base ID-based NIKD scheme. Our transforms from ID-KA protocols (i.e. interactive protocols) to CL-KEMs and IDKEMs are generic and do not require any special syntactic properties of the underlying ID-KA protocol.
In addition the transform of [19] results in ID-IND-CPA ID-KEMs/ID-based encryption schemes. Indeed, to obtain full CCA secure KEMs/encryption schemes it is easy to see that one needs to extend the security model in [19] for IDbased NIKD schemes in such a way as to provide the adversary with an analogue of our Reveal * oracles. Thus whilst our results are syntactically stronger than those of [19] , the security results are roughly equivalent. That we can achieve more syntactically is due to us considering interactive, as opposed to non-interactive, protocols as our starting point.
Notation
We end this introduction by recapping on the following standard notational conventions which will be used throughout this paper. We denote by ← the assignment operator, i.e., x←y means that the variable x is assigned the value y. With x←S where S is a finite set, we denote the process to assign to x a randomly and uniformly chosen value in S. If A is an algorithm, then x←A means assign x the output value of algorithm A, with associated probability distribution determined by the random coins of A.
Identity-based key agreement
In this section we present the notion of ID-based key agreement. We will only consider two-pass ID-based key agreement protocols in this paper as this simplifies the algorithm descriptions somewhat.
ID-based key agreement definition
A two-pass ID-based key agreement protocol is specified by six algorithms which run in polynomial time in the security parameter. The two passes are illustrated in Fig. 2 . We let ID denote the set of possible user identities and K KA (mpk KA ) be the set of valid session keys for the public parameter mpk KA . , d I ). This is a PPT algorithm run by the initiator, with identity I , of the key agreement protocol which produces the ephemeral public key epk I for transmission to another party. The algorithm stores esk I , the corresponding ephemeral private key, for use later 1 -Respond(mpk KA , d R ). This is a PPT algorithm run by the responder, with identity R, of the key agreement protocol which produces the ephemeral public/private key (epk R , esk R ).
1 Notice that we refer to the messages exchanged by the parties as public keys, and their secret states after the computation of the message as secret keys. Jumping ahead, this is because that's the role these values play in our transformation from KA to CL scheme.
. This is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm run by the initiator to derive the session key K I ∈ K KA (mpk KA ) with party R.
). This is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm run by the responder to derive the session key K R ∈ K KA (mpk KA ) with party I .
For correctness we require that in a valid run of the protocol we have that K I = K R . Notice that the creation of the ephemeral public/private key pairs does not depend on the intended recipient. Most ID-KA protocols are of this form. For example, in [11] ID-based key agreement protocols based on pairings are divided into four Categories. Only in Categories 2 and 4 does the ephemeral key pair depend on the intended recipient, these being protocols in the Scott [20] and McCullagh and Barreto [18] families. The majority of pairing-based ID-based key agreement protocols lie in the Smart [22] family (denoted Category 1 in [11] ), with Category 3 (the Chen and Kudla family [12] ) also sharing this property. The non-pairing-based protocol of Fiore and Gennaro [15] also has this property.
If the algorithms Initiate and Respond do not require access to d I and d R respectively, then we call the protocol a pure identity-based key agreement protocol. This is because the ephemeral public keys can be created before the sender knows his long-term secret key. This therefore allows forms of sending-into-the-future which are common in many IBE style schemes. We shall return to this distinction below when discussing the conversion of ID-KA protocols into certificateless schemes. Indeed identifying differences between these two forms of ID-KA protocols and certificateless schemes forms a significant portion of the current paper. In the categorization of [11] Categories 1, 3 and 4 are all pure ID-based key agreement protocols, whilst Category 2 and the non-pairing-based FG protocol are non-pure.
A key agreement protocol is said to be role symmetric if algorithm Initiate is identical to algorithm Respond and algorithm Derive I is identical to algorithm Derive R . The FG protocol is role symmetric, but role symmetry is a more complex property to determine for pairing-based protocols. For example, whether a scheme is role symmetric can depend on whether one instantiates the protocol with symmetric or asymmetric pairings. For the schemes in [11] (and focusing solely on the more practical scenario of asymmetric pairings) all those in Categories 2 and 4 are role symmetric, those in Category 3 are not, whereas half of those in Category 1 are. Of particular importance in Category 1 is the SCK protocols (which are a combined version of the Smart and Chen and Kudla protocol), these are highly efficient and role symmetric.
Defining security for ID-based key agreement
We will be using a modified version of the Bellare-Rogaway key exchange model, as extended to an identity-based setting. Our model is an extension of the model contained in Chen et al. [11] , but we extend it in various ways which we will describe later. So as to be precise we describe the model in more formal detail than that used in [11] ; however, we shall (as stated above) be focusing solely on two-pass protocols, which explains some of our specifications in what follows.
Security of a protocol is defined by a game between an adversary A and a challenger E. At the start of the game, the adversary A is passed the master public key mpk KA The adversary can execute a number of oracle queries which we now describe.
-NewSession(U, V ) This creates a new oracle, to represent the new session, which we shall denote by O = i U,V , where i denotes this is the ith session for the user with identity U and that the indented partner is V . After calling this oracle, we have
However, if any other oracle with identity U has been corrupted, then we set γ O = corrupted.
-Send(O, role, msg). Recall we are only modelling twopass protocols; hence the functionality of this oracle can be described as follows:
-If δ O =⊥, then do nothing. At the end of the game the adversary will output its guess b as to the bit b used by the challenger in the Test query. We define the advantage of the adversary by 
Forward secrecy
We also define a notion of master-key forward secrecy, (or mk-fs secure) following [11] . In this model the adversary is also given the master secret key msk KA . The advantage for forward secrecy of an adversary is defined in the same way as above and is denoted by one of
For non-pure ID-based key agreement protocols we can consider an additional notion of forward secrecy, which we call active perfect forward secrecy (resp. active forward secrecy). In this model we drop the third condition above that there exists another oracle O with which O * has had a matching conversation. This means that the adversary could have been active before corrupting the parties, i.e., he sent one of the two message flows.
It is interesting to observe that such notion cannot be achieved by any pure ID-based KA protocol because of the following attack. Assume the adversary acts as initiator and computes epk I ← Initiate(mpk KA ) (he can do that without d I as the protocol is pure). He can initiate a new session oracle setting epk I as first message, then ask for the second message and later make a test query on this oracle. When the adversary corrupts I , then he will have all the information needed to compute the correct session key and so he will be able to distinguish wether he received the real session key or a random one. It is easy to see that such attack does not apply to the case of non-pure protocols as the private key is needed to produce protocol's messages.
Our augmented security model
In our analysis of converting ID-based key agreement protocols into certificateless schemes we will require stronger security notions in which the adversary will have access to additional oracles. We define three such oracles, the first one is relatively standard, whilst the second two are new. The second can be motivated by similar arguments one uses to motivate resettable zero-knowledge [9] , whilst the third oracle is a natural analogue in the key agreement setting of the strong adversarial powers one gives an adversary for certificateless schemes. One may therefore consider the extreme nature of the third oracle as an additional argument as to why the certificateless strongest security model looks excessive.
wise return the value of the ephemeral secret key held within the oracle.
then this returns O to the state it was in before it received its last message, i.e., it sets
. This is a stronger version of the Reveal query in that it is not associated with an oracle, but simply takes the two message flows and returns the associated agreed shared secret assuming these messages had been transmitted between party I and party R.
There is an obvious restriction in that the adversary is not allowed to call this oracle on the message flows used in the Test query, nor (for role-symmetric protocols) with the message flows used in the Test query but with the roles of initiator and responder swapped.
The StateReveal(O) query corresponds to an adversarial power which can partially corrupt a party, but which does not allow the adversary to obtain the long-term secret. This power has been used in numerous works starting with [10] and is often considered to be the main distinction between the CK model and the BR model for key exchange [13] . The presence of the Rewind(O) oracle enables the adversary to extract more information for a particular set of ephemeral and static public key pairs. To intuitively see what the Rewind(O) oracle provides us, imagine a standard key agreement protocol based on standard Diffie-Hellman, for example the Station-to-Station protocol. Usually one reduces the security of this protocol to the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDH). But with the presence of a Rewind(O) oracle, the adversary can take a test oracle (which has output the ephemeral public key g x ) and obtain, using a combination of the Rewind(O) and Reveal(O) oracles, values of the form h x for values of h of the adversaries choosing. This means the simulator is essentially solving the DDH problem with access to a static-Diffie-Hellman oracle.
The Reveal * (I, R, epk I , epk R ) is a very strong oracle. As we will show later, if a protocol is secure even when an adversary is given such an oracle, we are able to transform the protocol into a certificateless encryption scheme which also satisfies a strong security notion.
We say a protocol is a secure ID-KA protocol in the Rewind-model (resp. Reveal * -model) if it is secure as IDbased key agreement protocol where we give the adversary access to a Rewind (resp. Reveal * ) oracle. If we require access to two of these oracles, we will call the model, for instance, the (StateReveal, Rewind) model. We call these extra models, augmented models, since they augment the standard security model with extra functionality. Similarly, we can define augmented notions for master-key forward secrecy.
Two example protocols
In what follows we will focus, as our motivating examples, on the pairing-based SCK protocol [11] and the non-pairingbased FG protocol [15] . Both have emphemeral keys that do not depend on the intended recipient, and both are role symmetric. However, the SCK protocol is a pure ID-based key agreement protocol, whereas the FG protocol is nonpure. We use the additive notation for group operations when describing SCK-2 (since this protocol is pairing based and therefore must be implemented over elliptic curves), and the multiplicative notation when describing FG (which can be implemented over any cyclic group).
SCK-2 protocol
This is described in the setting of an asymmetric bilinear pairingĥ : G 1 × G 2 −→ G T , where G 1 = P 1 and G 2 = P 2 are groups of prime order q. We require two hash functions, 
with Derive R being given by
We note that this protocol is pure and role symmetric and that the output key is equal to
Security of the SCK-2 protocol
We first define the following problems in our pairing-based group, all problems we assume are given relative to an "oracle" which computes a homomorphism φ :
See [11] for a discussion of this "oracle" in the context of Type 3 pairings.
Definition 2 (Pairing Problems)
We define four problems in the above pairing situation:
-Gap-BDH Problem: Solve the BDH problem with access to an oracle which solves the DBDH problem.
Given these definitions we have the following security results for the SCK-2 protocol:
The following statements are all in the random oracle model.
If the BDH problem is hard, then the SCK-2 protocol is a secure ID-KA protocol in the Rewind-model. 2. If the Gap-BDH problem is hard, then the SCK-2 proto-
col is a secure ID-KA protocol in the Reveal * -model.
If the XDH problem is hard, then the SCK-2 protocol is
master-key forward secure in the Rewind-model.
Proof
The first part follows from the proof of Theorem 1 in [11] , which is only given for the normal non-Rewind model, but it is seen to easily generalise to our situation. The second part again follows from the proof of Theorem 1 in [11] . To answer the Reveal * queries we need to add extra entries into the H 2 -list within the proof in [11] . However, to ensure consistency of the entries, we add we then need a DBDH oracle. The third part follows from Theorem 2 of [11] . It is interesting to notice that statements 1 and 3 hold under the same assumptions as in [11] . So, a stronger assumption, i.e., Gap-BDH, is introduced only to prove the security in the Reveal * model.
FG protocol
The construction, given in Fig. 3 , makes use of a group G = g of prime order q, and two hash functions:
where l is the bit length of the derived keys. Note that the protocol is non-pure as the Initiate and Respond protocols require access to the parties private key.
Security of the FG protocol
We first define the assumptions that are needed to prove the security of the protocol. In the following, assume G to be a cyclic multiplicative group of order q where q is a -bit long prime. We assume that there are efficient algorithms to perform multiplication and membership test in G. Finally we denote with g a generator of G.
Definition 3 (Diffie-Hellman Problems)
We define four problems in the above situation of a cyclic group G.
-Gap-DH Problem: Solve the CDH problem with access to an oracle which solves the DDH problem. The oracle is denoted by DH(U, V, W ). -SDH Problem: The Strong Diffie-Hellman problem 2 is a weaker version of the Gap-DH problem in that the input to the CDH problem are two elements U and V but the oracle is restricted to queries of the form DH(U, ·, ·), i.e. the first entry is fixed to U .
Given these definitions we have the following security results for the FG protocol:
Theorem 2
The following statements are all in the random oracle model. Proof Theorem 3 in [15] proves the first part in a non-Rewind model. But it is easy to see that the proof can be generalised to support the Rewind oracle as the same technique used to answer one reveal query can be extended to answer any reveal query when the message coming from the simulator is fixed. Theorem 3 of [15] assumes the SDH assumption, but again it is easy to see that if we instead assume the Gap-DH assumption then the Gap-DH oracle can be used to simulate the Reveal * oracle and gives a proof for the second part. The third part follows directly from the fact that the FG protocol satisfies master-key forward secrecy. The proof given in [15] can be easily extended to the Rewind-model for the same reason of point 1. Finally, in order to prove the last point, we observe that in the presence of the Gap-DH oracle it is possible to extend the proof of master-key forward secrecy given in [15] to support Reveal * queries.
If the Strong-DH problem is hard, then the
ear groups [7] . In this paper, we refer to the original terminology from [1] Also for the FG protocol, it is interesting to notice that statements 1 and 3 hold under the same assumptions as in [15] . The stronger assumption, i.e., Gap-BDH, needs to be introduced only to prove the security in the Reveal * -model.
From mutual to one-way authentication
In many key agreement protocols one is only interested in one-way authentication. SSL/TLS is a classic example of this, where the server is always authenticated but the user seldom is. We overview in this section the modifications to the previous syntax of ID-KA protocols which are needed to ensure only one-way authentication and show how to convert a mutually authenticated identity-based key agreement protocol into one which is only one-way authenticated. The reason for introducing only one-way authentication is that this enables us to make the jump to certificateless encryption conceptually easier and can also result in simpler schemes. We assume the responder in a protocol is the one who is not authenticated, this is to simplify notation in what follows. The scheme definitions are then rather simple to extend.
We note that any protocol proved to be secure for mutual authentication, can be simplified and remain secure in the context of one-way authentication. The transformation from mutual to one-way authentication is performed as follows. An identity is selected, let us call it R 0 , which acts as a "dummy" responder identity. A "dummy" secret key is then created for this user, and this is published along with the master public key. Notice, that by carefully selecting the dummy secret key one can often obtain efficiency improvements. The protocol is then defined as before except that R 0 is always used as the responding party, and we drop any reference to d R 0 . Thus we call Respond(mpk KA ) rather than Respond(mpk KA , d R 0 ). Similarly we call
and
In the security model all oracles either have R 0 as an intended partner or the oracle belongs to R 0 . If the oracle belongs to R 0 then it is corrupted, since R 0 s secret key is public. This means that only oracles belonging to R 0 may be used in the Test queries.
We argue that if the original protocol is secure, then its one-way version (obtained as described above) is also oneway secure. To see this, observe that an adversary A that breaks the security of the one-way protocol can be turned into an adversary B against the original protocol. Assume A breaks the security choosing a test session that involves a user I D (and the dummy identity R 0 ). Then B can trivially choose a test oracle s R 0 ,I D and forward the obtained key to A.
Two example protocols
We carry on with our two running examples:
SCK-2 protocol
To convert the SCK-2 protocol to one which is only oneway authenticated, we set R 0 to be an "identity" such that
, the point at infinity on the curve. It does not matter that we cannot find such an R 0 since we will never actually use the precise value of R 0 . The private key extraction for legitimate users is performed as before, as are the Initiate and Respond algorithms. The only difference is now in the Derive I and Derive R methods, which are defined by:
respectively. Note that the output key is now equal to
FG protocol
To convert the FG protocol to one which is only mutually authenticated, we can obtain a highly efficient scheme by selecting s R 0 = 0, and hence setting r R 0 = 1, and "fixing" the random oracle to be such that H 1 (R 0 r R 0 ) = 0. So the Respond algorithm simply selects esk R 0 ←Z q and then computes epk R 0 = g esk R 0 . The Derive algorithms become:
Thus we see that Derive R becomes considerably simpler when considered in the one-way-authenticated protocol case.
Certificateless key encapsulation mechanisms
In this section we discuss various aspects of certificateless KEMs. The reader is referred to [6] and [14] for further details.
CL-KEM definition
A CL-KEM scheme is specified by seven polynomial time algorithms:
-CLSetup(1 t ) is a PPT algorithm that takes as input 1 t and returns the master public keys mpk CL and the master secret key msk CL . 
CL-KEM security model
To define the security model for CL-KEMs we simply adapt the security model of Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] into the KEM framework, as explained in [6] . The main issue with certificateless encryption is that, since public keys lack authenticating information, an adversary may be able to replace users' public keys with public keys of its choice. This appears to give adversaries enormous power. However, the crucial part of the certificateless framework is that to compute the full private key of a user, knowledge of the partial private key is necessary.
To capture the scenario above, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] [3] [4] ] consider a security model in which an adversary is able to adaptively replace users' public keys with (valid) public keys of its choice. Such an adversary is called a Type-I adversary below.
Since the KGC is able to produce partial private keys, we must of course assume that the KGC does not replace users public keys itself. By assuming that a KGC does not replace users public keys itself, a user is placing a similar level of trust in a KGC that it would in a PKI certificate authority: it is always assumed that a CA does not issue certificates for individuals on public keys which it has maliciously generated itself! We do, however, treat other adversarial behaviour of a KGC: eavesdropping on ciphertexts and making decryption queries for example. Such an adversarial KGC is referred to as a Type-II adversary below.
Below we present a game to formally define what an adversary must do to break a certificateless KEM [6] . This is a game run between a challenger and a two stage adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) . Note that X can be instantiated with I or II in the description below and that the master secret msk CL is only passed to the adversary in the case of Type-II adversaries.
Type-X Adversarial Game
When performing the encapsulation, in line three of both games, the challenger uses the current public key pk * of the entity with identifier I D * . The adversary's advantage in such a game is defined to be
where X is either I or II. A CL-KEM is considered to be secure, in the sense of IND-CCA2, if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage in both the games is a negligible function of t.
The crucial point of the definition above is to specify which oracles the adversary is given access and which are the restrictions of the game. According to such specifications, one can obtain different levels of security. A detailed discussion about all possible security definitions is given by Dent in [14] . In the following, we describe the various oracles O available to the adversaries, we then describe which oracles are available in which game and any restrictions on these oracles. Also note that one can obtain this functionality using the Strong Decap oracle when the certificateless scheme is pure. -Decap: On input of an encapsulation C and an identity I D, it outputs the session key obtained decapsulating C with the original secret key created by I D. One can obtain this functionality using a Strong Decap oracle if the scheme is pure.
Using these oracles we can now define the following security models for certificateless KEMs, see [14] for a full discussion.
Strong Type-I security
This adversary has the following restrictions to its access to the various oracles.
-A cannot extract the full private key for I D * .
-A cannot extract the full private key of any identity for which it has replaced the public key.
-A cannot extract the partial private key of I D * if A 1 replaced the public key (i.e. the public key was replaced before the challenge was issued). -A 2 cannot query the Strong Decap oracle on the pair (C * , I D * ) unless I D * 's public key was replaced after the creation of C * . -A may not query the Weak SV Decap or the Decap oracles (although for pure schemes, one can always simulate these using the Strong Decap oracle).
We note that this security notion is often considered to be incredibly strong; hence often one finds that it is weakened in the following manner.
Weak Type-Ia security
Dent describes in [14] a weaker security definition called Weak Type-Ia that was also used in [6] . Weak Type-Ia security does not allow the adversary to make decapsulation queries against identities whose public keys have been replaced. In this case, the restrictions on the adversaries oracle access is as follows:
-A cannot extract the full private key of any identity for which it has replaced the public key. unless the attacker replaced the public key before the challenge was issued.
Though this notion is clearly weaker than Strong Type-I, it still looks reasonable for practical purposes. In fact, Strong Type-I gives to the adversary as much power as possible, but it is unclear whether a real adversary can obtain decapsulations in practice from users whose public keys have been replaced by the adversary itself. We pause to note that there are weaker forms of Type-I security called Weak Type-Ib and Weak Type-Ic security. In Weak Type-Ib, security access to the Weak SV Decap oracle is denied to the adversary, whereas in Weak Type-Ic security not only denies access to the Weak SV Decap oracle, but it also denies the ability to the replace public keys entirely. We also can define a CPA like-notion, which we call Weak Type-I-CPA which denies access to all forms of decapsulation oracle (this is a notion which is not used in other papers, but which will be useful when we present our conclusions). 
In addition, for each definition of Type-I security, we can define a slightly weaker variant denoted by * (e.g. Strong Type-I*) in which the adversary cannot query the partial private key of the target identity I D * at any point. This weaker variant (already defined in [14] ) will simplify somewhat our security theorems. Yet, it still allows us to obtain a final nonweakened result due to the combination with security theorems for Type-II security, which we define below. This is a surprising result as Dent claims that the * 'ed Type-I security models "should not be used", due to their weaker properties. However, our Theorem 3 below shows that the simplification of Type-I * security results in no overall loss of security when combined with Type-II security. Dent [14] presents these different notions in the form of a table, which we present a modified version of in Table 1 
Strong Type-II security
In the Type-II game the adversary has access to the master secret key msk CL and so can create partial private keys itself. The strong version of this security model enables the adversary to query the various oracles with the following restrictions:
-A cannot extract the full private key for I D * . -A cannot extract the full private key of any identity for which it has replaced the public key. -A 1 cannot output an identity I D * for which it has replaced the public key. -A cannot query the partial private key oracle at all. -A 2 cannot query the Strong Decap oracle on the pair (C * , I D * ) unless the public key used to create C * has been replaced. -A may not query the Weak SV Decap or the Decap oracles (although for pure schemes, one can always simulate these using the Strong Decap oracle).
Note, because we assume in this case that the adversary is the KGC, the adversary does not have access to the partial private key oracle since all partial private keys are ones which he can compute given msk CL . This applies even in the case where generation of the partial private key from msk CL and I D is randomised.
Weak Type-II security
As for the case of Type-I security, one can consider a weaker variant of Type-II security. In this notion, the adversary is not allowed to replace public keys at any point, and thus, it cannot make decapsulation queries on identities whose public keys have been replaced. This is the traditional form of Type-II security and is aimed at protecting the user against honest-but-curious key generation centres. Again a weak form, which we call Weak Type-II-CPA, can be defined which gives no access to any decapsulation oracle, this form of security will only be needed in the discussion leading up to our conclusions. There are other strengthenings of the Type-II model which try to model completely malicious key generation centres, see [14] for a discussion of these models. But we will not consider these in this paper. We summarize the oracle access for the security models we do consider in Table 2 .
Full Type-I security from Type-I* security and strong Type-II security
In this section we justify our consideration of Type-I* security by showing that proving a scheme Type-I* secure is sufficient to get "full" Type-I security if such a scheme also satisfies the strongest notion of Type-II security. In some sense this says that the definitions Type-I and Strong Type-II overlap in a specific case. For ease of presentation we prove the theorem for the case of Strong Type-I security, but it is easy to see that it holds Let E be the event that the adversary asks I D * 's partial private key during its attack. According to the definition of Strong Type-I security E can never occur in a run of A 1 . This means that the game played by an adversary A 1 is exactly the same of a Strong Type-I* adversary. On the other hand, it is easy to see that an adversary A 2 can be turned into an adversary B that breaks Strong Type-II security as follows. B receives in input the master secret key of the KGC so being able to provide A 2 with the partial private key of any identity. Moreover B can answer all oracle queries made by A 2 simply by forwarding such queries to its corresponding oracles. Since by definition A 2 will not replace I D * 's public key before asking the challenge ciphertext, then the simulations is perfect.
Generic construction of CL-KEM from ID-KA
In this section we show our main result, namely a generic transform of any ID-KA protocol into a CL-KEM scheme.
Suppose we are given algorithms for a one-way authenticated ID-KA protocol (KASetup, KeyDer, Initiate, Respond, Derive I , Derive R ). Given a one-way identitybased key agreement protocol KA, we let CL(KA) denote the derived certificateless KEM obtained from the following algorithms.
-CLSetup (1 t 
-Dec(mpk CL , sk I D , C). Decapsulation is obtained by executing
In the above construction if the underlying ID-based key agreement protocol is pure (resp. non-pure), then we will obtain a pure (resp. non-pure) certificateless KEM, i.e. it will follow the original formulation of Al-Riyami and Paterson (resp. Baek et al. 
Two example protocols
Using the two previous identity-based key agreement protocols we are able to present the following certificateless key encapsulation schemes. The first one is a pure scheme, while the second is a non-pure scheme, this follows from the properties of the underlying key agreement protocols.
SCK-2 protocol
We assume the same set-up for the SCK-2 key agreement scheme in terms of G 1 , G 2 , G 
FG protocol
We assume the same set-up for the FG protocol in terms of G, H 1 and H 2 . The derived CL-KEM is then defined by: -CLSetup(1 t ). We set x←Z q , compute y←g x . We then define msk CL ←x and mpk CL ←y. 
Security results on the ID-KA to CL-KEM transforms
Once we have defined our black-box construction of CL-KEM from ID-KA protocols, we prove its security in the theorems below. As one can see, the theorems show that the resulting CL-KEM can achieve different types of security according to the security of the underlying ID-KA protocol. As already discussed in the introduction, this relationship between the security models of ID-KA and CL-KEM sheds light on understanding which are the correct notion of security for the two primitives. and for non-pure schemes we have
where q pk is the maximum number of extract public key queries issued by algorithm B.
Proof Assume there exists an efficient adversary A that is able to break the Strong Type-I* (resp. Weak Type-Ib* or Weak Type-I-CPA*) security of CL(KA) with non-negligible advantage . Then we show how to build a simulator B that exploits A to break the relevant security of the one-way authenticated KA protocol. We shall deal with the three parts of the Theorem together, so we shall deal with the different types of Type-I security in the one argument.
Setup: B receives in input from its challenger the master public key mpk KA of the KGC and hands such key to A. The simulator also maintains a table K eyList where it stores the keys of identities involved in the simulation and other extra informations related to them. The table contains Flipping the coin c I D is equivalent to make a guess on the challenge identity I D * that should remain uncorrupted. We now turn to describing how each oracle query made by A is answered by B. Algorithm B looks for a tuple containing I D in K eyList and replaces the current public key with pk I D . Notice that these queries only occur in the case of Strong Type-I* adversaries in our theorem. 5. Strong Decap query (C, I D) . Recall, these type of queries can occur only if A is a Strong Type-I* adversary. In this case B constructs a query to the Reveal * oracle for the pair two parties I D and R, with the respective message flows epk I D and C. Notice that the response from this oracle will even deal with the case where the public key has been replaced. If I D * / ∈ K eyList, then algorithm B first generates a public key for it as above, using the case c I D * = 1 in the case of non-pure schemes. If I D * ∈ K eyList and c I D * = 0 then algorithm B terminates the simulation and aborts. Otherwise, since we then know that I D * is not corrupted, the simulator performs the following actions: The simulation is perfect if B does not abort during the entire simulation. And algorithm B will only abort in the case of non-pure schemes, in this case the probability that B wins is bounded by
The probability that B does not abort during the simulation is (1 − δ)δ q pk where q pk is the number of public key queries issued by the adversary during the simulation. Since A is polynomially bounded the value of q pk is also bounded by a polynomial. Moreover the value (1 − δ)δ q pk is maximised at δ = 1 − 1/(q pk + 1). This means that the probability that B does not abort is at least 1 e(q pk +1) . In conclusion we have that B s advantage for non-pure schemes is at least e(q pk +1) , which is non-negligible if we assume that A s advantage is also non-negligible.
We notice that the proof technique does not allow the simulator to provide the partial private key of the challenge identity I D * . Which is why our theorem is stated for the case of Strong Type-I* (resp. Weak Type-Ib* or Weak Type-I-CPA*). If we then apply the result of Theorem 3, along with the following theorems, we obtain full Strong Type-I security (resp. Weak Type-Ib or Weak Type-I-CPA) for the scheme CL(KA).
In looking at Type-II security we present two security theorems. The first one (Theorem 5) is conceptually simpler but requires our underlying identity-based key agreement scheme to have a strong security property (i.e. it must support state reveal queries). The second theorem (Theorem 6) is more involved and does not provide such a tight reduction. On the other hand, the second theorem requires less of a security guarantee on the underlying key agreement scheme. Note that the simulation is perfect and B wins with the same advantage of A.
We now turn to showing that one does not necessarily need the StateReveal query to prove security, although the complication in the proof results in a less tight reduction. Proof Assume there exists an efficient adversary A that is able to break Type-II security of CL(KA) with non-negligible advantage . Then we show how to build a simulator B that exploits A to break the master-key forward secrecy of the one-way authenticated KA protocol. Again, we deal with the three different types of Type-II security in the one argument. 
The probability that B does not abort during the simulation is (1 − δ)δ q pk where q pk is the number of public key queries issued by the adversary during the simulation. Since A is polynomially bounded the value of q pk is also bounded by a polynomial. Moreover the value (1 − δ)δ q pk is maximised at δ = 1 − 1/(q pk + 1). This means that the probability that B does not abort is at least 1 e(q pk +1) . In conclusion we have that B s advantage is at least e(q pk +1) which is non-negligible if we assume that A s advantage is also non-negligible.
By combining Theorems 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 we obtain the following corollary. 
Identity-based key encapsulation mechanisms
In this section we are going to show the relationship between CL-KEM and identity-based KEMs. In particular we will give a generic transformation from any pure CL-KEM into an ID-KEM. As in the case of ID-KA and CL-KEM, here, it is also interesting to observe how the different security models of CL-KEM transform into analogous models for ID-KEM. Before giving our result, we recap on identity-based KEMs, the reader is referred to [6] for further details.
ID-KEM definition
A ID-KEM scheme is specified by four polynomial time algorithms: The two oracles provided to the adversary, i.e. the Extract and Dec oracles, come with the following restrictions:
-Extract may at no point be called on the challenge identity I D * ; -Dec may at no point be called on the pair (I D * , C * ).
The above adversary is called an ID-IND-CCA adversary, if we disallow Dec queries then the adversary is an ID-IND-CPA adversary. The advantage of such a CCA adversary is defined to be
with a similar definition for a CPA adversary. A scheme is deemed to be secure if for all adversaries A, the advantage is a negligible function of the security parameter.
Generic construction of ID-KEM from pure CL-KEM
To construct an ID-KEM from a CL-KEM the obvious solution is to set the user public/private keys to be trivial and known to all parties. This however can only be done for pure CL-KEMs since in non-pure schemes one does not have complete control over the public/private keys, since they depend on the partial private key d I D . We call the resulting scheme the ID(CL) scheme, as it is an ID-KEM built from a CL-KEM.
Example: the SCK-2 protocol
Only one of our CL-KEM examples given before is a pure scheme, namely the one derived from the SCK-2 ID-based key agreement protocol. Thus we continue the discussion using this protocol as a motivating example. Again, we assume the same set-up for the SCK-2 key agreement scheme in terms of G 1 , G 2 , G T , and H 1 . But now we defined H 2 as a hash function from G T to {0, 1} t . The derived ID-KEM is then defined by, by setting t I D to be equal to zero in the underlying CL-KEM; 
To decapsulate the receiver computes
We note that this has resulted in the Boneh-Franklin-based ID-KEM first proposed by Lynn in [17] . This scheme is was proved to be secure in the random oracle model in the full version of [6] under the hardness of the Gap-BDH problem. In this latter paper, the ID-KEM is referred to by the name "Construction 1". 
(B).
Proof Assume there is an efficient adversary A that is able to break the security of ID(CL) with non-negligible advantage . We build a simulator B which breaks the security of the underlying CL scheme.
The algorithm B is relatively trivial. The input master public key mpk CL for algorithm B is first passed to algorithm A. When A makes a Extract query for identity I D, algorithm B makes a request for the partial private key of party I D. It also replaces the public key of I D with the trivial key required for the ID(KA) construction. Any Dec queries made by A are passed onto the Strong Decap oracle provided to algorithm B. When A outputs the challenge identity I D * , this is passed on by algorithm B to its challenger, who then responds with a C * which is passed directly back to algorithm A.
It is clear that all restrictions on oracles queries by B do not affect the responses to oracle queries made by A. In addition, the advantage of A is equal to the advantage of B.
We now apply this theorem to the SCK-2 scheme. Combining with the first bullet point in Corollary 1, we obtain that the ID-KEM derived from the SCK-2 scheme is ID-IND-CCA secure assuming the Gap-BDH problem is hard. Thus we have recovered, albeit in a round about way, the result of [6] on the ID-KEM of Lynn [17] .
Conclusion: which certificateless model is correct?
In this section we summarize the conclusions we have drawn from our analysis. It is worth pointing out that these are personal conclusions, and we leave the readers to draw their own analysis.
Firstly, all our conclusions are predicated on the assumption that our transforms are all "natural", in that they are the obvious way to convert an ID-KA protocol into a CL-KEM and a CL-KEM into an ID-KEM. On the other hand, it is also "natural" to consider an ID-KA protocol as an interactive version of a CL-KEM scheme. So, if these are the natural transformations, then the underlying security and syntactic models should also transform naturally.
Pure versus non-pure
First we discuss the issue of pure vs. non-pure certificateless schemes. Our transform from CL-KEMs to ID-KEMs requires the underlying CL-KEM to be pure. This is not surprising as an essential feature of ID-based cryptography is that of the identity (and hence the associated secret key) being independent of all parameters bar the actual identity. It is not surprising even because non-pure CL-KEMs are the only ones that can be constructed without pairings.
We draw two conclusions from this. First, the pure syntax is more powerful as it enables functionalities such as encryption-into-the-future (a.k.a. workflow). Second, we can say that certificateless encryption is a primitive simpler than ID-based encryption, although people have usually thought at the former as an extension of the latter. When ID-based encryption was proposed [21] , one of its main motivations was to avoid the certificates management issues of standard public key encryption. Then it took almost twenty years to have IBE schemes, basically thanks to the idea of exploiting pairings. From our considerations we can say that the "hard part" of constructing ID-based encryption is not avoiding certificates, but achieving those additional properties (e.g. workflows), i.e., technically speaking, having a user's public key independent of the scheme parameters.
CPA security
Before turning to CCA security of certificateless encryption we first consider the simpler case of CPA security. We remarked in the introduction that the [19] construction of IDbased encryption from ID-based NIKD schemes only produces CPA secure schemes, unless one assumes an oracle equivalent to our Reveal * oracle.
Similar considerations apply in our case. The construction of ID-KEMs from CL-KEMs will produce a CPA secure ID-KEM if the underlying CL-KEM is Weak Type-I-CPA* secure. Note, that we only require Weak Type-I-CPA* and not Weak Type-I-CPA security.
In constructing CL-KEMs from ID-KA protocols we need to consider what security is required of the underlying ID-KA protocol to ensure Weak Type-I-CPA and Weak Type-II-CPA security of the CL-KEM. Our theorems show that a sufficient condition is that the underlying ID-KA protocol is secure in the standard sense, i.e. with no Reveal * , Rewind or StateReveal oracles. Although the security reduction is tighter if we assume the adversary has access to StateReveal oracles, i.e., we use a CK-like security model for ID-based key agreement.
We note that the security reductions go through more naturally when one considers the CL-KEM to have Weak Type-I-CPA* security and Weak Type-II-CPA security. We then obtain the full Weak Type-I-CPA by appealing to the analogue of Theorem 3.
CCA security
Our theorems show that to obtain full Strong Type-I and Strong Type-II security of the derived CL-KEM, we require the ID-based key agreement security model to give the adversary access to our Reveal * oracle. This is a very nonstandard oracle for key agreement protocols, but this should not be surprising. Essentially CCA security for an encryption scheme means the adversary has to be able to open anything, even something created in an illegitimate way (even if the opening results in the ⊥ symbol). All our Reveal * oracle does is to provide the adversary against the IDbased key agreement scheme with an oracle to open anything.
A similar remark as to Strong Type-I* as opposed to Strong Type-I security as mentioned in the above comments on CPA security also applies in this case.
Summary
So in summary we believe the correct syntactic security definitions for CL-KEMs should be schemes with Strong Type-I* and Strong Type-II security where the pure syntax allows for more properties. By using Strong Type-I* as the security definition instead of Strong Type-I we obtain a natural separation between the two security notions, rather than dealing with the cases in the intersection twice.
However, our construction from ID-based key agreement schemes would seem to imply that the correct security definition should be one which uses StateReveal queries (i.e. one which follows the analogue of CK-security). However, it also implies that the model also includes Reveal * queries, which seems to provide an extreme form of security definition for key agreement schemes. Since it would seem silly to define security for normal key agreement schemes and ID-based key agreement schemes in a different manner, this would imply that standard key agreement schemes should also be defined to be secure in the presence of a Reveal * oracle. This final conclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory, and we hope our work will inspire other researchers to investigate this connection.
